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Abstract
We o¤er a model and evidence on rms optimal bankruptcy decisions.
In the model, both the borrower and bank lenders can trigger a bankruptcy
ling. We show that debt composition has signicant inuence on corporate
bankruptcy decisions. For example, rms with a small share of bank debt as
a fraction of total debt tend to voluntarily le for bankruptcy. When a rm
depends heavily on bank debt, the bankruptcy boundary is more likely to be
determined by the bank. Our results highlight the control rights of large pri-
vate creditors in distressed rms.
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I Introduction
What are the circumstances under which a rm is forced into bankruptcy rather than
les for bankruptcy voluntarily? Understanding corporate bankruptcy decisions is
key to models of nancial contracting, credit risk and capital structure. A large body
of theoretical corporate nance research assumes or concludes that rms can, and
sometimes do, le for voluntary bankruptcy. On the other hand, it is widely known
that banks monitor rms closely and can sometimes accelerate their loans, which
usually forces the borrower into bankruptcy. Apparently, a model that investigates
the bankruptcy decisions of both the borrower and the lender has yet to be devel-
oped. There also seems to be little or no empirical evidence on the determinants
of who makes a rms bankruptcy decision. This paper lls some of this gap. We
demonstrate that in a model with three classes of claimants, the composition of debt
is an important determinant of the bankruptcy boundary. Our empirical evidence
conrms the predictions of the model and shows that e¤ects of creditor composition
on corporate bankruptcy decisions are economically and statistically signicant. In
particular, our evidence shows that bank lenders are more likely to set the bank-
ruptcy boundary when (1) the rm depends heavily on bank debt, (2) the bank
receives a small fraction of the rms total interest payments, (3) the average bank-
debt interest rate is high, (4) the rm has highly concentrated public bonds, (5) the
rm has highly concentrated bank debt, and (6) the expected time in bankruptcy is
long. In addition, banks are also more likely to force bankruptcy during periods of
bad macroeconomic performance.
We adopt a structural approach to modeling the conicts of interests regarding
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bankruptcy decisions among three classes of claimants, namely the equity holders,
bondholders, and bank lenders. In our model, a rms debt composition is given and
xed and the bank debt is senior to the bond. Equity holders can le for bankruptcy
voluntarily. Bank debt has covenants that give banks the right to force a distressed
rm into bankruptcy, even if the rm has made all debt payments.1 Bonds do not
have such covenants.
Our model, though stylized, provides rich predictions about rmsbankruptcy
triggers. We show that if a bank triggers a bankruptcy, the rms asset value at
the time of ling, excluding costs, is just enough to repay the bank debt in full;
this is not the case for bankruptcies triggered by the equity holders. We exploit
this result to guide our empirical analysis. Moreover, the assumption of multiple
classes of debt in a rms debt structure allows us to examine the relation between
bankruptcy decisions and debt composition, which has only recently been considered
in the literature on structural models of default. Earlier models have assumed a
single class of debt. Our model predicts that both macroeconomic conditions and rm
characteristics have signicant inuences on the bankruptcy boundary. Firm-specic
factors include the bank-debt share of total debt, bank-debt concentration, public-
debt concentration, the bank-debt share of total interest payments, the weighted
average bank-debt interest rate, and the time spent in bankruptcy. For example, our
model predicts that rms with a small ratio of bank debt to total debt tend to le
for bankruptcy voluntarily, and that when a rm depends heavily on bank debt, the
bankruptcy boundary is more likely to be determined by the bank.
1In the literature, it is common to assume such a strong loan covenant to capture banksstrong
control when the borrower is in distress. See, for example, Gorton and Kahn (2000).
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To empirically test our hypotheses, we construct a measure that is related to
which party, the borrower or the bank lender triggers a bankruptcy. Following our
model, a bankruptcy is triggered either by the bank or by the equity holders once the
asset value of the rm falls to a threshold level, the bankruptcy boundary. We proxy
this boundary value of assets, excluding bankruptcy costs, by the rm-wide default
recovery, which is the total amount of repayments of the rm to all its creditors.
We then divide the rm-wide recovery by the total bank-debt principal to construct
a normalized realization of the bankruptcy boundary (NRBB). The model predicts
that if the bank lender triggers a bankruptcy, then the expected after-cost recovery
of the rm should be just enough to cover the bank-debt principal amount. Based
on this result, the value of NRBB should be 1 for bank-triggered bankruptcies and
should deviate from 1 for voluntary bankruptcy lings. The larger is jNRBB   1j,
the more likely is a bankruptcy to be led voluntarily, according to our theoretical
model. In our empirical analysis, we therefore use jNRBB   1j as a proxy for the
likelihood of a voluntary bankruptcy ling.
Our paper contributes to the literature on creditor control rights. Until recently,
the prevailing view in the literature is that the role of creditors in corporate gov-
ernance is negligible outside of bankruptcy or before a payment default. Recent
empirical evidence has shown that creditors, through the channel of loan covenants,
inuence both rm investment policy [Chava and Roberts (2008) and Nini, Smith,
and Su (2009)] and rm nancial policy [Roberts and Su (2009a) and Su (2009)]
even when the borrower is solvent. Our paper adds to the literature by showing that
large private creditors have signicant inuence on when a distressed rm les for
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bankruptcy. Moreover, our results highlight the role of debt composition in deter-
mining the control power of private creditors.
Much of the existing theory of defaultable corporate debt focuses on equity hold-
ersoptimal default policy. Using a contingent-claims framework, Black and Cox
(1976) and Geske (1977) value coupon-paying debt and solve for the equity holders
optimal default policy when asset sales are restricted. Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner
(1989), Leland (1994), Leland and Toft (1996), Leland (1998), and Goldstein, Ju,
and Leland (2000) examine the optimal default policy in the problem of optimal cap-
ital structure. Some existing theory focuses on the banksrole in rmsbankruptcy
decisions. In a two-period model, Bulow and Shoven (1978) show that conicts of
interests among asymmetrical claimants imply that there are circumstances under
which it is optimal for the bank creditor to force bankruptcy, even though bankrupt-
cies are associated with real costs. Carey and Gordy (2007) provide a model in the
spirit of Black and Cox (1976), and derive the optimal bankruptcy threshold value
of asset value below which a forced bankruptcy occurs. They conclude that banks
play a key role in the bankruptcy decisions.
Our research extends the literature by examining the e¤ect on bankruptcy de-
cisions of explicitly expanding the strategy space open to both equity holders and
bank lenders. Unlike the above-mentioned existing theories that consider a single
class of debt, with the exception of Carey and Gordy (2007), our model involves
multiple classes of debt, which allows us to examine the e¤ect of debt composition
on bankruptcy decisions.
Our results are also related to the literature on recovery rates, as determined by
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a rms value at the time of bankruptcy ling and by negotiations during the bank-
ruptcy process. Carey and Gordy (2007) show that bank-debt share is an important
determinant of rm-wide recovery rates. Covitz, Han, and Wilson (2006) nd no
signicant inuence on recovery rates of time spent in bankruptcy. By contrast,
Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan (2007) nd that there is a statistically signicant,
negative relationship between bond recovery rates and the time spent in bankruptcy.
Zhang (2009) documents that macroeconomic conditions are an important deter-
minant of rm-wide recovery rates, both through covenant setting at the time of
loan origination, and at the time of default. In this paper, we show that bank-debt
share, time spent in bankruptcy and macroeconomic conditions all have a signicant
inuence on rmsbankruptcy decisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes our theoretical
model and solves for optimal bankruptcy strategies. Section III presents testable
hypotheses. Section IV describes the data, discusses our choice of independent vari-
ables, and reports sample statistics. Section V presents our main results. Section VI
concludes. Proofs of propositions are given in Appendices A and B.
II Structural Model
In this section, we describe a model of corporate bankruptcy. The solution to this
model motivates our empirical study. In particular, the solution implies that, in
a bank-triggered bankruptcy, the rms asset value at the bankruptcy ling is just
enough to repay the bank in full after paying for bankruptcy costs.
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We model the bankruptcy decisions of borrowers and lenders. We focus on con-
icts of interests among three classes of claimants on the assets and income ows
of the rm: equity holders who run the rm, bondholders, and a bank lender. The
equity holders can le for voluntary bankruptcy, and will do so when the asset value
of the rm is so low that the costs of making payments to creditors outweighs the
benets of running the rm as a going concern, with the option to default later. In
the mean time, the loan contracts include covenants that permit the bank to fore-
close on the borrower and force repayment through the bankruptcy process. The
incentive for the bank to do so is to preserve assets of the borrower. A high recovery
of principal is more important than interest payments to the bank when the borrower
is at the brink of collapse. The bondholders are assumed to have no rights to force
bankruptcy. This follows a common assumption in the prior literature that com-
pared with bank lenders, dispersed bondholders have poor monitoring ability and
high coordination costs. Moreover, empirical evidence has shown that covenants in
bank loan contracts are signicantly tighter than those in bond contracts.
We adopt a time-homogeneous framework, following Leland (1994). Under this
assumption, the optimal bankruptcy policies of the borrower and the bank lender
are both of a threshold type. That is, a bankruptcy is triggered when the market
value of the rms assets falls to or below an endogenous threshold.2 Our attention,
however, is focused on endogenizing bankruptcy decisions of the rm and the bank
2We focus on bankruptcy boundary of asset value following Black and Cox (1976), Gilson, John,
and Lang (1990), Leland (1994), and Longsta¤ and Schwartz (1995), rather than on bankruptcy
boundary of liquidity as in Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994), Kim, Ramaswamy, and Sun-
daresan (1993), and DeAnglo, DeAnglo, and Wruck (2002). For a study on whether default is
triggered by low market asset values or by liquidity shortages, corresponding to economic versus
nancial distress, see Davydenko (2007).
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lender. We thus assume that the debt structure is exogenous, and that all debt
service must be met by issuing new equity. This limitation implies that the optimal
capital structure choice is not endogenized in this paper.
A Model Setup
Consider a rm, operated by equity holders, with a rate t of cash ow given by a
geometric Brownian motion with proportional drift  and volatility . That is,
dt = t dt+ t dWt: (1)
where W is a standard Brownian motion with respect to the probability space and
information ltration common to all agents.
All agents in the model are risk-neutral and discount cash ows at a xed market
interest rate r. The asset value of the rm is thus given by
Vt = Et
Z 1
t
e r(s t)s ds

=
t

; (2)
where   r  and Et denotes expectation given fs : s  tg. Here we assume that
r > . It follows that
dVt = Vt dt+ Vt dWt
The rm is nanced by debt and equity, and has a tax rate of . Without loss
of generality by normalization of V0, we assume that the total face value of debt is
1. This unit of debt is divided into a single loan with face value  and a single class
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of bonds with face value (1  ). The bond is junior to the loan. For simplicity,
only the loan has covenants that permit foreclosure. The loan receives interest at a
continuous interest rate of c.3 The bond receives cash ows at a rate of c0. The total
interest payment rate is C  c+ c0.
A bankruptcy can be triggered either by the equity holdersvoluntary default,
or by the banks decision to accelerate its loan. The cost of bankruptcy is a fraction
(1  ) of the total rm value, Vt, at the time of ling. The bankrupt rms value
is divided among its creditors according to absolute priority. That is, the bank gets
minf; Vtg. The bondholders get any remainder.
A bankruptcy policy is a stopping time E chosen by equity holders and a stopping
time B chosen by the bank. A bankruptcy is led at the earlier of these two stopping
times,   min fB; Eg. At any time t before  , the market value of equity is
St (Vt; E; B) = Et
Z 
t
e r(s t) (Vs   (1  )C) ds

.
The market value of the loan is
Lt (Vt; E; B) = Et
Z 
t
e r(s t)c ds+ e r( t)minf; Vg

:
For a given bankruptcy policy B of the bank, equity holders maximize the market
3Throughout the model, we focus on the case where c=r > , because if the bank-debt interest
payment, c is so low that c=r  , the bank will force bankruptcy immediately to get a high recovery
entitled by the high face value of bank debt, .
9
value of equity by solving
S0 (v0; B)  sup
E2T
S0 (v0; E; B) ; (3)
where T is the set of stopping times, with solution denoted ^E (B). Similarly, given
the policy E of equity holders, the bank solves
L0 (v0; E)  sup
B2T
L0 (v0; B; E) ; (4)
with solution ^B (E).
Equations (3) and (4) form a stochastic game with symmetric information. An
equilibrium of this game is a pair of default policies ( E; 

B) that solves
^E (

B) = 

E (5)
^B (

E) = 

B.
B Solution
To solve the model, we rst dene strategies in terms of hitting boundaries.
Denition 1 A hitting-boundary strategy is dened as the rst time the rms asset
value falls to or below a threshold level. That is, E = inf ft : Vt  vEg for the
equity holders, and B = inf ft : Vt  vBg for the bank lender, where vE and vB are
time-invariant boundary values of assets.
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Armed with hitting-boundary strategies, our model is simplied tremendously.
A solution is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose there exists an equilibrium characterized by constant hitting
boundaries, vE (vB) for the equity holders and v

B (vE) for the creditors. Assume that
the optimal boundaries are characterized by the smooth-pasting condition, i.e., the
rst derivatives, with respect to Vt, of the market values of the equity and the bank
loan at the optimal boundaries are 0. Then:
(i) Given any bankruptcy threshold, vB, for the bank, the equity holders have a weakly
dominant bankruptcy strategy, which is to le for bankruptcy as soon as the rm value
falls to vE  (1 )+1 Cr , where  = 12

  2
2

+
q 
  2
2

+ 2r2

. Therefore, the
optimal bankruptcy strategy for the equity holders is vE (vB) = vE.
(ii) Let vmB  1 +1 cr . Given any bankruptcy threshold, vE, for the equity holders, the
banks optimal bankruptcy threshold is:
vB (vE) =
8>>>><>>>>:
vE, if vB < vmB
vB, if vmB  min fvE; vBg
argmaxv2fvE ;vBg ~Lt (Vt; vE; v) , if vB> v
m
B > vE,
where vB  = and ~Lt is the market value of the loan dened as ~Lt (Vt; vE; vB) 
Lt (Vt; E; B), with  i = inf ft : Vt  vig, i 2 fE;Bg.
The equity holdersbankruptcy threshold coincides with the endogenous liqui-
dation boundary found by Leland (1994). Although forward-looking equity holders
have the option of conditioning their bankruptcy decision on the banks bankruptcy
policy, they never use it. Equity holders le for voluntary bankruptcy whenever they
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are unable to raise funds by issuing more equity. By contrast, the banks optimal
bankruptcy policy is a¤ected by that of the equity holders.
We can solve (5) by using Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 In the equilibrium described by Proposition 1, the optimal bankruptcy
threshold is
v =
8>>>><>>>>:
vE, if vB < vmB or vE vB vmB
vB, if vB  vEvmB
argmaxv2fvE ;vBg ~Lt (Vt; vE; v) , if vB > v
m
B > vE.
The solution is better understood in Figure 1. In equilibrium, a rms optimal
bankruptcy threshold value of assets is not always the higher of vE and vB. Banks
sometimes do not foreclose their loans even when the rm value has fallen to or below
the threshold level vB. In particular, banks delay forcing a rm into bankruptcy when
(1) the loan interest rate is high (that is, if vE < vB < vmB ), and (2) the equity holders
threshold value of rm assets for voluntary bankruptcy is su¢ ciently low (that is,
if ~Lt (Vt; vE; vE) > ~Lt (Vt; vE; vB) and vB > vmB > vE). However, if vE is higher than
vB, then the bankruptcy threshold value of assets is set by the equity holders.
III Testable Hypotheses
The most critical implication of our structural model is that if a bank triggers a
bankruptcy, the rms asset value at the time of ling, excluding costs, is just enough
to repay the bank debt in full. This is not the case for bankruptcies triggered by
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the equity holders. We will discuss how to exploit this implication in our empirical
study in Section IV B.
In addition, our structural model has a number of testable implications for bank-
ruptcy decisions that we now briey discuss. We focus on factors that determine
who (the bank or the equity holders) triggers the bankruptcy. Six factors are high-
lighted, namely bank-debt share in total debt, bank-debt interest rate, bank-debt
share of interest payments, bank-debt concentration, public-debt concentration, and
time spent in bankruptcy.
A Bank-debt share of total debt
First, as discussed in the introduction, our model implies that the composition of the
rms debt, in particular the bank-debt share in total debt at the time of bankruptcy,
is a signicant determinant of the bankruptcy decision. For rms with a small share
of bank debt, bankruptcy is more likely to be triggered by equity holders. In contrast,
for rms with a large share of bank debt, a banks decision to force bankruptcy is
more determinative.
Intuitively, banks monitor their borrowers closely and usually set tight bank-
ruptcy thresholds in order to protect their principal.4 The more the bank debt, the
more assets are needed for the bank to allow the rm to continue, and hence the
more likely is the banks bankruptcy threshold to exceed that of equity holders. In
4Empirical evidence has been established in the literature (e.g. Gupton, Gates, and Carty
(2000), Van de Castle, Keisman, and Yang (2000), Schuermann (2004), Acharya, Bharath, and
Srinivasan (2007), and Carey and Gordy (2007)) that bank-debt recovery rates are very high. For
example, Van de Castle, Keisman, and Yang (2000) reports that, between 1987 and 1996, the
average recovery rate for bank loans is about 85%, signicantly larger than the average recovery
rate of 39% for all bonds in the same period.
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addition, a high bank-debt share in total debt suggests strong dependence of the
borrowing rm on bank nancing, which may strengthen the control and bargain-
ing position of the bank.5 For a rm with a high bank-debt share of total debt,
bankruptcy is more likely to be triggered by the rms bank lender.
This is also clear from our model. A higher bank-debt share () implies a higher
vB, which means that a bankruptcy at vB is more likely to give a higher loan value
than a bankruptcy at vE (see the top graph in Figure 1).
This is summarized as follows.
Hypothesis 1 Holding other parameters constant, the higher is the bank-debt share,
the more likely is the bankruptcy threshold value of assets to be set by the bank lender.
B Bank-debt share of interest payments
A rms cash ows are distributed to claimants via dividends and debt interest
payments. The bank lender receives the fraction, c=C, of the total interest payment
of the rm. The lower is the bank-debt share of interests, the more cash ows will be
diverged to bondholders if the bank chooses not to force bankruptcy, which makes
it more likely that the bank terminates the rm early by setting a high bankruptcy
threshold, other things equal.
Proposition 2 indicates that the bank is in control if, in addition to a high bank-
debt share, the bank-debt share of interests is small, that is, if c=C   (1  ).
5For example, empirical evidence from Houston and James (1996) suggests that the management
decisions of a rm that borrows from a single bank are strongly inuenced by that bank. Carey and
Gordy (2007) suggest that the positive relationship between recovery rates and bank-debt share
comes from the high bankruptcy thresholds set by banks for those borrowers with more bank debt.
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Hypothesis 2 All else equal, the bankruptcy threshold is more likely to be deter-
mined by the bank for rms with a smaller bank-debt share of interests.
C Bank-debt interest rate
In order to determine the optimal bankruptcy threshold, the bank balances between
more loan interests and a higher default recovery of principal. Here, two competing
e¤ects of bank interest rates are at play. On the one hand, higher interest payments
for the bank would motivate the bank to allow the rm to survive longer by setting
a low bankruptcy threshold, in which case equity holders are more likely to control
bankruptcy timing. This follows directly from our model. Proposition 2 suggests
that, everything else being equal, the e¤ective bankruptcy boundary is more likely
to be set by the equity holders if the bank interest payment rate is high, that is,
if c > r (1 + 1=). On the other hand, interest rates reect a banks ex ante
expectation about the rms default and recovery risk. For example, rms paying
high loan interests may have low tangible loan collateral, and hence high bankruptcy
costs and low . This implies a high level for vB, and makes it more likely that
the bank sets the bankruptcy boundary. Because our theory does not model the
ex ante pricing of the loan but rather focuses on the ex post bankruptcy decisions,
which of the two e¤ects dominates is an empirical question. The following hypothesis
summarizes.
Hypothesis 3 If raising bank interest expense raises the likelihood of bankruptcy
boundary to be set by equity holders, then the benets of receiving interest payments
dominate the benets of default recovery. In contrast, if raising bank interest expense
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lowers the likelihood that the bankruptcy boundary is set by equity holders, then the
benets of default recovery dominate the benets of receiving interest payments.
D Bank-debt concentration
Bank-debt concentration also a¤ects the bankruptcy decision through anticipated ex
post coordination. The intuition is that if a rm is borrowing from only one bank, the
banks coordination costs are low during the bankruptcy process. A sole bank lender
can monitor and negotiate more e¢ ciently. Moreover, a sole bank lender has stronger
bargaining power relative to the rm, because the rms nancing depends heavily
on the bank. Ex-post bankruptcy costs are thus lower for rms with high bank-debt
concentration. Foreseeing this, the bank would set a bankruptcy boundary that is
su¢ ciently low so that it can collect as much interest payments as possible. Hence,
the e¤ective bankruptcy boundary is likely to be set by the rm in this case.
This is not a direct prediction of our model, which considers a rm that borrows
from only one bank. One might, however, suppose that coordination costs are cap-
tured by the recovery parameter . That is, if bank debt is concentrated, leading
to lower ex post coordination costs, the frictional cost of bankruptcy  is smaller,
implying a larger . The banks optimal bankruptcy threshold, vB, is inversely re-
lated to . It is thus more likely for the equity holders to determine the bankruptcy
boundary if  is large.
Hypothesis 4 Everything else being equal, the equity holders are more likely to set
the bankruptcy boundary in rms with highly concentrated bank debt.
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E Bond concentration
The e¤ect of concentrated public bonds on bankruptcy boundaries is twofold. On the
one hand, more concentrated public bondholders would incur less ex post coordina-
tion costs, which, following an argument similar to that for bank-debt concentration,
causes the bank to set a lower bankruptcy boundary. On the other hand, high con-
centration among public bondholders gives bondholders stronger ex post bargaining
power, which may help them extract more recovery from the banks. Foreseeing this,
the bank may implement a higher bankruptcy boundary ex ante, and hence it is more
likely that the bankruptcy boundary is determined by the bank, opposite to the pre-
diction of the other e¤ect. Which of these two e¤ects dominates is an empirical
question.
Hypothesis 5 If rms with a high concentration among public bondholders are more
likely to have a bankruptcy boundary set by equity holders, then the e¤ect of reduced
coordination costs among bondholders dominates, leading to a low bankruptcy bound-
ary set by the bank. If, in contrast, rms with a high concentration among public
bonds are more likely to have a bankruptcy boundary set by their bank lender, then
the e¤ect of increasing the bargaining power of bondholders through concentration
dominates, leading to a high bankruptcy boundary set by the bank.
F Time in bankruptcy
As argued by Jensen (1989) and Hart (2000), claimholdersstrategies, and thus a
rms bankruptcy boundary, are endogenously a¤ected by bankruptcy costs. Con-
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ventional wisdom holds that the time spent in bankruptcy is an important measure
of deadweight bankruptcy costs. This is supported by the fact that the direct costs
of restructuring such as fees for retaining investment bankers, attorneys and re-
structuring professionals increase with time, as well as by the belief that shorter
workouts can lower the indirect costs of bankruptcy by limiting the impact of bank-
ruptcy on a rms reputation, can free valuable management time from drawn-out
negotiations, and can reduce the extent to which rms forego valuable investment
opportunities.6 So, if bank creditors expect a long time in bankruptcy, they may set
a high bankruptcy boundary to cover the higher frictional costs, implying a higher
likelihood that the bank determines the e¤ective bankruptcy boundary.7
This follows naturally from our model. A longer time in bankruptcy means more
costs, lower , and hence higher vB. Based on Hypothesis 3, we know that it is more
likely as  declines that the banks boundary is the e¤ective default boundary.
Hypothesis 6 If the expected time in bankruptcy is lengthened, it is more likely for
the bank to set the bankruptcy boundary, ex ante, to cover higher ex post bankruptcy
costs, controlling for other factors.
6The evidence in the literature, however, is not conclusive. Thorburn (2000) nds that the costs
of bankruptcy increase with the time in default. However, Andrade and Kaplan (1998) nd that
time spent in restructuring does not inuence the costs of nancial distress. In addition, Maksimovic
and Phillips (1998) nd a nonlinear impact of time spent in bankruptcy, with productivity declines
observed only in those rms that exit immediately from bankruptcy and that are in bankruptcy for
more than four years.
7Alternatively, banks may ex ante charge higher interest payment rates if they expect long
time in bankruptcy, which implies that they do not necessarily adjust the bankruptcy boundaries.
However, time in bankruptcy is sensitive to the state of the economy at bankruptcy [see Covitz,
Han, and Wilson (2006)]. So bankruptcy boundaries are a more exible way for banks to adjust
accordingly than the ex ante-xed interest payment rates.
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IV Data and Measures
Our objective is to test the determinants of which party, the bank or the equity
holders, triggers bankruptcy. Toward this end, we proxy for the generally unobserv-
able bankruptcy boundary by a normalized realization of the bankruptcy boundary
(NRBB), constructed from default recoveries. In particular, NRBB is dened as the
ratio of the total recovery of a defaulted rm to its total bank-debt principal amount.
It follows from our model that the expectation of NRBB for a bank-triggered bank-
ruptcy is 1, and that the value deviates from 1 if the bankruptcy is triggered by
equity holders. Hence, jNRBB  1j is a measure of the likelihood of a bankruptcy
being triggered by equity holders. We then test hypotheses regarding bankruptcy
decisions by a regression analysis.
A Data
The sample of recovery rates is a March 2008 extract of the Ultimate Recovery
Database (URD) of Moodys, covering the period from April 1987 to July 2007.8
In addition to security-level ultimate recovery rates for each default event, the URD
also provides a detailed descriptive information of each defaulted security of the rm,
including the instrument type, the principal amount outstanding at default, and the
relative ranking in the companys debt structure.
We manually merge the recovery data with rm accounting information from
COMPUSTAT, complemented when possible by SEC lings.9 To measure macro-
8The ultimate recovery rate for a defaulted security is the eventual repayment to holders of this
defaulted security, as a fraction of principal.
9Our nal sample involves bankrupt private rms, whose accounting information is not available
19
economic performance, we use the trailing 12-month average (across rms and time)
rm-wide recovery rate from the URD, the trailing 12-month number of default
events from URD, and the trailing 12-month aggregate default rate of speculative-
grade corporate bonds from Moodys.
For the years from 1987 to 2007, the URD contains 741 rm-default events,
involving 3,678 defaulted debt instruments. We exclude all rms with no bank debt
at default. We eliminate rms whose NRBB is too high. This yields a nal sample
of 576 rms with 2,918 defaulted debt instruments.10
B Variables
This subsection denes variables used in our regression analysis.
B.1 Normalized Realized Bankruptcy Boundary
The key challenge to empirically studying bankruptcy decisions is the lack of a mea-
sure of the bankruptcy boundary, which is generally unobservable.11 We solve this
problem by employing the ultimate recovery rates of debt instruments of defaulted
from COMPUSTAT. Where possible, we extract the accounting information for these rms from
their SEC lings.
10Out of the 165 rms excluded from the original sample in the URD, 128 do not have a bank
credit facility at default. This large fraction of rms nancing only through public debt is consistent
with the empirical evidence of Cantillo and Wright (2000) that rms are more likely to issue either
public or private debt, rather than a mixture of the two. The rest of the rms, 37 in number, have
NRBBs higher than 10. We exclude these from our sample in order to address the concern that
our results may be driven by outliers. However, our results are essentially unchanged if we relax
the allowed maximum NRBB from 10 to 50.
11One may argue that when a rm les for bankruptcy petition, they usually indicate whether
it is voluntary or forced. This paper, however, focuses on the driving party of a bankruptcy case,
not just what it seems on the surface. In fact, many of the rms ling for voluntary petitions
enter bankruptcy because they fail to renegotiate with creditors, which are considered as forced
bankruptcy cases in this paper.
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rms, and by assuming that the realized total recovery of a defaulted rm is an unbi-
ased, after-cost estimate of the rms bankruptcy threshold value of assets. Speci-
cally, we measure the realized bankruptcy boundary by the total recovery of a default
rm. We normalize the recovery by the rms total bank-debt principal amount. The
normalized realization of the bankruptcy boundary (NRBB) for rm i is dened as
NRBB i =
P
j2Alli R
j
iP
j
iP
k22Banki P
j
i
;
where Rji is the recovery rate of security j in rm i, P
j
i is the principal amount of
security j in rm i, Banki is the set of bank debt instruments of rm i, such as bank
loans and revolving lines of credit, and Alli is the set of all debt instruments of rm
i.
In the framework of our theory, the realized total recovery,
P
j2Alli R
j
iP
j
i corre-
sponds to v, the after-cost total rm value at default.12 The total principal amount
of bank debt,
P
k22Banki P
j
i corresponds to bank-debt share . Hence,
NRBB i = v= =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
vE= > 1, rm triggers, if vE > vB
vE= < 1, rm triggers, if vE < vB and vmB > vB
1, bank triggers, if vB > vE > vmB
1, bank triggers, if vB > vmB > vE and small vE
vE= < 1, rm triggers, if vB > vmB > vE and large vE.
NRBB is directly related to a rms bankruptcy decision. When a bankruptcy is
12This is because, after paying for bankruptcy costs, the rms value at default is divided among
its claimants, which is measured by the total rm-wide recovery.
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triggered by the bank, NRBB is theoretically one. When the bankruptcy is triggered
by the equity holders, NRBB deviates from one. The larger the deviation, the more
likely is the bankruptcy to be triggered by the rm.
In the empirical analysis, we investigate the cross-sectional determinants of bank-
ruptcy decisions by regressing the deviation of NRBB from one, jNRBB   1j, on the
factors proposed in Section III.
B.2 Independent variables
This subsection introduces the independent variables used in the empirical analysis.
Their predicted e¤ects on jNRBB   1j are summarized in Table I.
Bank-Debt Share. Bank-debt share is measured by the total principal amount of
a rms bank debt at the time of bankruptcy ling, as a fraction of its total principal
amount of all defaulted debt.13 Based on Hypothesis 1, a larger bank-debt share
implies a higher threshold value of assets required by the bank, and hence a higher
likelihood that the bank triggers the bankruptcy. We expect a negative relation
between jNRBB   1j and bank-debt share.
Bank-Debt Share of Interests. We measure the bank-debt share of interests by
the total interest expense paid to a rms bank creditors as a fraction of its total
interest payments to all creditors. So, we dene
CpnShr i =
P
j2Banki CijP
j
iP
j2Alli CijP
j
i
,
13Bank debt here refers to all private debt from both banks and non-bank nancial institutions.
Out of the 576 rms in the nal sample, 29 rms borrow from non-bank nancial institutions. My
estimates, however, are qualitatively una¤ected if we exclude these rms.
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where Cij is the interest rate for debt instrument j of rm i and P
j
i is the face value
of the same instrument.
Based on Hypothesis 2, we expect a positive association between jNRBB   1j
and bank-debt share of interests.
Bank-Debt Interest Rate. The bank-debt interest expense rate is the weighted
average of a rms bank debt payments, dened by
BnkCpni =
P
j2Banki CijP
j
iP
j2Banki P
j
i
,
where Cij is the interest expense rate for debt instrument j of rm i and P
j
i is the
face value of the same instrument.
Hypothesis 3 suggests that the relationship between jNRBB   1j and bank-debt
interest expense rate can go either way. If the relationship is negative, we know that
the benets of receiving interest payments dominate the benets of default recovery.
If, on the other hand, the relationship is positive, we know that the benets of high
default recovery dominate.
Bank-Debt Concentration. In my empirical analysis, bank-debt concentration is
measured by the Herndahl-Hirschman (HH) index of the nominal amounts of bank
debt instruments of the rm, across di¤erent lenders, dened by
HHIBanki =
P
j2Banki L
2
ijP
j2Banki Lij
2 ; (6)
where Lij is the face value at o¤ering of the j-th loan of rm i. The HH index is
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one if there is a single bank loan in the capital structure, and is near zero with many
lenders holding similar face values.
Following Hypothesis 4, we expect a positive relationship between jNRBB   1j
and bank-debt concentration.
Public-Debt Concentration. Similar to bank-debt concentration, public-debt
concentration is measured by the HH index of the nominal amounts of public debt
instruments, including senior secured bonds, senior unsecured bonds, senior subor-
dinated bonds, subordinated bonds, and junior subordinated bonds.
HHIBondi =
P
j2Bondi B
2
ijP
j2Bondi Bij
2 ; (7)
where Bij is the face value at o¤ering of the j-th bond of rm i, and 
Bond
i is the set
of all public bonds of rm i.14
The e¤ect of public-debt concentration on the bankruptcy boundary can go ei-
ther way, as suggested by Hypothesis 5. If jNRBB   1j and HHIBondi are positively
related, we conjecture that the e¤ect of reduced coordination costs dominates. If,
in contrast, the relationship is negative, we suspect that the e¤ect of the increased
bargaining power held by bondholders dominates.
Time in Bankruptcy (TIB). We measure TIB by the number of months from a
rms bankruptcy ling to its bankruptcy resolution. Here we assume that the real-
14This focuses on layers of di¤erent bonds of a rm and ignores concentration of holdings within a
given bond type. This is mainly because during bankruptcy, the U.S. Trustee, the bankruptcy arm of
the Justice Department, appoints a committee to represent the interests of dispersed bondholders.
The coordination costs associated with bond complexity is largely captured by that of di¤erent
layers of bonds.
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ized time in bankruptcy is an unbiased estimate of the ex ante expected time spent
in bankruptcy. Based on Hypothesis 6, we expect a negative relationship between
jNRBB   1j and TIB.
C Descriptive Statistics
Figure 2 illustrates the cross-sectional distribution of NRBB among our sample rms.
The majority of the rms have NRBB concentrated around 1. Consistent with
Hypothesis 1, the majority of the rms that have an NRBB near 1 are rms that
borrow exclusively from banks.15
Table II reports descriptive statistics on NRBB for rms in our nal sample. Panel
A is for all rms in the sample. The mean NRBB is 1.85, with a sample standard
deviation of 1.66. Panel B categorizes rms by SIC code. Industry classications
are based on the SIC manual of the U.S. Department of Labor website. Based on
the summary statistics, we nd no statistically signicant di¤erence in the means of
NRBBs between any two industries.16 Panel C shows the distribution of NRBB by
year of bankruptcy ling. Compared to bankruptcies in the other years, those led
in 2001 have a lower average NRBB. Those led in 2004, 2006, and 2007 have higher
average NRBBs, This suggests that macroeconomic performance may a¤ect rms
bankruptcy decisions, an issue that we investigate in Section Appendix B..
15Out of the 34 rms that have NRBB exactly equal to 1, 30 rms borrow only from banks.
16For each pair of industries, we calculate the t-statistic for the di¤erence of their group means
by tij = ( mi   mj) =
q
^2i =ni + ^
2
j=nj , where mi and mj are the group means, ^i and ^j are the
group standard errors, and ni and nj are the number of rms in the industries. We nd that tij is
small for any pair of industries.
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Table III gives summary statistics for all other independent variables, both for
our nal sample (Panel A) as well as for the full URD sample (Panel B). Except for
bank debt-related variables, namely Bank-Debt Share, Bank-Debt HHI, and Bank-
Debt Share of Interests, the statistics for the two samples resemble each other. Our
nal sample rms necessarily have bank debt, which makes it not surprising that the
three bank debt-related variables are positively skewed in our sample compared with
those of the full URD sample.
Compared with the URD full sample and Moodys Default Risk Service (DRS)
sample, rms in our nal sample are representative in terms of rm size, default
type, default resolution type, and industry. This is shown in Table IV, where we
compare the summary statistics of our nal sample, the URD full sample, and the
DRS sample.
V Empirical Results
A Empirical Methodology
The main part of our empirical analysis relates bankruptcy decisions to variables that
inuence the strategic actions of bank creditors and equity holders. We proxy the
realized after-cost bankruptcy boundary with NRBB, the rm-wide total recovery as
a multiple of the rms total bank-debt principal amount. We assume that NRBB is
an unbiased estimate of the e¤ective after-cost asset value at bankruptcy normalized
by total bank debt.
Based on our model, banks do not necessarily trigger bankruptcy when the rms
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asset value hits their default threshold vB, allowing a non-monotonic relation be-
tween NRBB and bankruptcy decisions. We address this issue by using jNRBB   1j,
the deviation of NRBB from 1, to measure the likelihood of a bankruptcy being trig-
gered by equity holders. This works because NRBB is equal to 1 for bank-triggered
bankruptcies. Some caveats about this measure should be noted. The rst concerns
the consistency of estimates from an OLS regression, given that jNRBB   1j by de-
nition is no less than 0. Therefore, in addition to OLS regressions, we also use
Tobit regressions in our analysis. Second, the dependent variable is a proxy of the
likelihood of a bankruptcy to be triggered by equity holders, which makes it hard to
quantify the magnitude of the inuence of the independent variables.
We rst focus on testing the hypotheses developed in Section III, then on the
e¤ect of macroeconomic conditions on bankruptcy decisions. The inuences of other
claimants and the role of an alternative measure of bankruptcy decisions are consid-
ered afterwards.
B Hypothesis Testing
Table V reports results of regressions of jNRBB   1j on factors a¤ecting bankruptcy
decisions, controlling for rm size and rm leverage.
First, we consider bank-debt share. More bank debt suggests a higher bankruptcy
boundary of assets, in order for the bank to better protect its principal. Hypothesis
1 predicts that rms with a high bank-debt share are more likely to have bankruptcy
boundaries set by their bank creditors. This is strongly supported by the regres-
sion results. As predicted, Table V shows a signicant negative relation between
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bank-debt share and jNRBB   1j, which proxies the likelihood that the bankruptcy
boundary is set by equity holders. This e¤ect is statistically signicant across di¤er-
ent samples and regression methods. Our result contributes to an understanding of
the main nding of Carey and Gordy (2007), that bank-debt share is an important
predictor of rm-wide recovery rates.
Bank-debt share of interest payments, however, has the opposite e¤ect. A smaller
fraction of total interest payment paid to banks implies a lower benet that banks
achieve by lowering their bankruptcy boundary for assets. Hence, as predicted by
Hypothesis 2, the bankruptcy boundary is more likely to be set by the bank in rms
with a small bank-debt share of interest payments. This is supported by the results
of Table V, consistently across all six regressions.
Table V shows that rms with high bank-debt interest rates are more likely to
have their bankruptcy boundaries determined by bank creditors. Based on Hypoth-
esis 3, the empirical evidence suggests that the poor rm quality regarding default
recovery reected by high bank interest payment rates dominates the benets of re-
ceiving interest payments. That is, although banks may prefer lowering their bank-
ruptcy boundaries on rms that pay high interests, the fact that these rm are riskier
actually makes the banks impose higher bankruptcy boundaries.
More concentrated creditors have higher ex post bargaining power and may incur
lower ex post coordination costs. For banks, Hypothesis 4 predicts that these two
e¤ects work together to lower their ex ante bankruptcy boundary, making the equity
holders more likely take control. This is conrmed by the positive regression coe¢ -
cient on bank-debt HH index in Table V. For bondholders, however, these two e¤ects
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work against each other. Which e¤ect takes control is an empirical question, as sug-
gested by Hypothesis 5. Table V shows a signicant negative regression coe¢ cient
on public-debt HH index, which suggests that the expected higher ex post bargain-
ing power of highly concentrated bondholders dominates the e¤ect of a reduction in
coordination costs.
Banks would set high bankruptcy boundaries for rms that are expected to have
long work-out periods, in order to cover the higher costs of the bankruptcy process.
Consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 6, Table V shows a signicant negative
coe¢ cient on TIB. This supports the nding of Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan
(2007) that there is a statistically signicant, and negative relationship between bond
recovery rates and time spent in default.17
Table V shows that equity holdersdecisions on bankruptcy boundaries are signif-
icantly inuenced by all of the factors proposed in our hypotheses. The directions of
the inuences are consistent across the six specications, across di¤erent samples, and
across di¤erent regression methods. This implies that, in our sample, both the bank
creditors and the equity holders play a role in determining the bankruptcy bound-
ary. Which claimant takes the lead depends strongly on the rms debt structure
and on the expected ex post bankruptcy costs. Thus, in capturing the determinants
of timing of defaults, it may be important to incorporate both banksinuence on
management and rmsbankruptcy decisions.
17Carey and Gordy (2007) and Covitz, Han, and Wilson (2006) study rm-wide and bond re-
covery rates, respectively, and they nd no signicant inuence on recovery rates of time spent in
bankruptcy. Our results do not conict with their results either, because our Hypothesis 6 predicts
that banks raise bankruptcy boundary due to high expected costs in the bankruptcy process. High
bankruptcy boundary does not necessarily lead to high recovery rates, as it may be o¤set by the
realized high bankruptcy costs.
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C Inuence of Macroeconomic Conditions
Panel C of Table II suggests that macroeconomic performance may a¤ect a rms
bankruptcy decision. If banks foresee that an economic downturn is imminent, they
may impose a higher bankruptcy boundary so as to compensate for the low valuation
of assets in bad times.18 If so, one expects that banks are more likely to trigger
bankruptcies when macroeconomic conditions are poor.
We exploit three di¤erent measures of macroeconomic conditions in order to
investigate this e¤ect, namely the average rm-wide recovery rate, the number of
default events, and the trailing 12-month aggregate default rate of speculative-grade
corporate bonds. We regress jNRBB   1j on macroeconomic variables, controlling
for all of the rm characteristics that were used in the baseline regression model. We
also examine the e¤ect of including year dummy variables in the baseline regression.
The results are reported in Table VI. Consistent with our prediction, macroeconomic
conditions have a strong positive association with jNRBB   1j. The results suggest
that during economic downturns, banks keep a close eye on their borrowers and are
more likely to trigger bankruptcies than equity holders, and that this e¤ect is robust
across di¤erent measures of macroeconomic conditions.
Our result is consistent with the nding of Roberts and Su (2009b) that macro-
economic conditions inuence the outcome of renegotiations. This result also com-
plements the literature that examines how bankslending decisions depend on macro-
economic conditions. In bad times, banks tighten lending standards and make loans
18Existing literature has shown that default recovery rates are low in bad times. See, for example,
Frye (2000a), Frye (2000b), Altman, Brady, Resti, and Sironi (2005), Hu and Perraudin (2002),
Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan (2007), Bruche and Gonzalez-Aguado (2008), and Zhang (2009).
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available to rms with good credit quality, the so-called ight-to-qualitye¤ect.19
D Inuence of Other Creditors
A key assumption of our structural model and empirical analysis is that bank cred-
itors can monitor better than public bondholders, and can force bankruptcy when
necessary. In this subsection, we investigate how our estimates would be a¤ected if
other creditors share banksinformational and coordination advantages. For exam-
ple, it is a legal bankruptcy standard that banks and those creditors that are assigned
equal priority by a conrmed reorganization plan are paid pari passu. Hence, banks
may take these other creditors, usually holders of senior secured bonds, into consid-
eration when deciding when to trigger bankruptcy.
Toward this end, we construct new measures of NRBB by replacing total bank
debt amount in the denominator by the total principal amounts of di¤erent classes of
debt. Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of our sample rms according to the newly
implied denitions of NRBB. Panel A shows that, under the new NRBB measures,
more rms are concentrated in the region where NRBB is between 0 and 1. There
are two explanations for this. First, banks may be able to trigger bankruptcy at a
threshold of asset value that is high enough to cover the principal of bank debt, but
bondholders are unlikely to be able to do so. Second, holding the rm-wide recovery
the same, including more debt in the denominator under the new measures naturally
decreases NRBB. In order to distinguish between these two explanations, we plot
19See, among others, Rajan (1994), Lang and Nakamura (1995), Weinberg (1995), Asea and
Blomberg (1998), Lown, Morgan, and Rohatgi (2000), Ruckes (2004), OKeefe, Olin, and Richard-
son (2005), DellAriccia and Marquez (2006), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008), Gorton and He
(2008), Guner (2007), and Zhang (2009).
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in Panel B the distributions of the newly dened NRBBs for di¤erent samples and
di¤erent denitions of NRBB. Panel B shows that the majority of rms that are
nanced with only bank debt have NRBBs close to one, and that the rms with only
bond nancing spread between zero and one. Panel B indicates that after controlling
for the second explanation, the rst e¤ect is still signicant, which is consistent with
our original hypothesis that banks have advantages over bondholders.
We also examine the determinants of the new NRBB measures by regressing them
on our independent variables. The idea is that, if other creditors also play a role in
rmsbankruptcy decision, the e¤ects of the various factors that we have examined
on the new NRBB measures should resemble those of Table V.
For comparison purposes, the rst two columns of Table VII show estimates using
our original NRBB measure. The two columns in the middle of the table include in
the denominator of NRBB all debt that has the same ranking as bank debt. The last
two columns include both bank debt and senior secured bonds. Except for bank-debt
share, whose impact has a smaller magnitude on the new NRBB measures, the e¤ects
of all the other factors are either reversed or statistically insignicant. For example,
in our original specication, a higher average bank interest rate is associated with a
smaller likelihood of the rm triggering bankruptcy, suggesting that the information
about a rms quality that is embedded in interest rates outweighs the tradeo¤
between receiving interest payments and protecting principal, based on Hypothesis
3. In the new specications, however, rms with higher average interest rates are
more likely to le for bankruptcy voluntarily, which, according to Hypothesis 3,
implies the opposite.
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Table VII indicates that our main hypotheses are not satised with the new
NRBB measures. This suggests that other creditors, though they may have the
same claim priority as banks, do not share the role played by banks in corporate
bankruptcy decisions.
E An Alternative Specication
As discussed at the beginning of this section, an empirical challenge to testing our hy-
potheses is how to measure the identity of the claimant that triggers the bankruptcy.
This is due to strategic bankruptcy policy of banks, leading to a non-monotonic re-
lationship between NRBB and the likelihood of the bankruptcy being triggered by
the bank. We use jNRBB   1j, the deviation of NRBB from the expected NRBB
value of 1 for bank-triggered bankruptcies, as the dependent variable in our hypoth-
esis testing. It is of independent interests to distinguish between the cases where
NRBB>1 and NRBB<1, and to examine whether the proposed factors have similar
e¤ects in each case. This subsection considers an alternative specication to address
this issue.
We stratify the sample of rms according to their NRBB values to ltering out
those with a small NRBB, which are most likely to be bankruptcies triggered by
equity holders at low bankruptcy boundaries. For the remaining sample, the re-
lationship between NRBB and the likelihood of the bankruptcy being triggered by
equity holders is likely to be monotonic. We then run regressions of NRBB on various
factors to test our hypotheses.
Compared with the estimates from the original specication, whose dependent
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variable is jNRBB   1j, the estimated e¤ects of the proposed factors on NRBB,
shown in Table VIII after censoring rms with NRBB less than 0.98, 0.8, and 0.5,
are essentially unchanged. However, if we lter out the rms with NRBB larger than
1.2, 2, and 5, and conduct the same regression analysis, the e¤ects of the proposed
factors are gone.20 This suggests that, in our original specication, the results are
mainly driven by bankruptcies with high recovery as multiples of bank-debt face
value. These cases are more likely to be equity-holder-triggered bankruptcies. For
rms with small NRBB, equity holder-triggered bankruptcies are hard to distinguish
from the ones that are actually triggered by banks that have a realized recovery that
is less than expected.
VI Conclusion
A large body of theoretical corporate nance research assumes that rms can, and
sometimes do, le for bankruptcy voluntarily. It is widely known that banks monitor
rms closely and can sometimes accelerate their loans, forcing the borrower into
bankruptcy. This paper is the rst to model both parties strategic bankruptcy
decisions and empirically documents a selection of factors that are likely to a¤ect
which party, the rm borrower or the bank lender, determines the rms e¤ective
bankruptcy boundary.
We show that the composition of debt is an important determinant of the bank-
ruptcy boundary. Bank creditors are more likely to force bankruptcy lings for rms
with a high bank-debt share of their total debt, highly concentrated bank debt, mul-
20To save space, these estimates are not reported.
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tiple public bonds, a low share of total interests paid to banks, a high bank-debt
interest rate, and longer expected time spent in bankruptcy. In addition, banks are
also more likely to force bankruptcy during periods of bad macroeconomic perfor-
mance. Our results highlight the role of large private creditor in distressed rms.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We rst derive the market values of equity and the equity holdersoptimal
bankruptcy boundary as a function of the banks optimal bankruptcy boundary,
following Leland (1994). We then derive the market value of bank debt and solve for
the banks optimal bankruptcy boundary, conditional the equity holdersstrategy.
Equity Value
Equity holders are residual claimants in bankruptcy. Bondholders and the bank
have higher priority. In determining the optimal bankruptcy threshold for equity
holders, the conict of interests is between equity holders and all creditors.
In order to derive the equity value, we rst calculate total debt value (D), bank-
ruptcy costs (BC), and the value of tax shield (TS). The equity value is then given
by (V  D + TS  BC).
The creditors receive a constant total interest payment, C, per unit of time,
when the rm is solvent. It is well known (for example, Black and Cox (1976) and
Leland (1994)) that the market value, D (V; t), of a claim whose current cash ow
rate depends on the level of Vt of the rms assets satises the partial di¤erential
equation
1
2
2V 2Dvv (V; t) + V Dv(V; t)  rD(V; t) +Dt(V; t) + c = 0:
In this time-homogeneous setting, the debt value does not depend on time explicitly.
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That is, D (V; t)  D (V ). The equation above thus reduces to
1
2
2V 2Dvv (V ) + V Dv(V )  rD(V ) + C = 0;
which has a general solution of
D(V ) = A0 + A1V + A2V
 ; (8)
where
 =
1
2
"
  
2
2

+
s
  
2
2

+ 2r2
#
,
and A0, A1, and A2 are determined by the following boundary conditions21:
lim
V!1
D (V ) =
C
r
;
lim
V!vE
D (V ) = vE:
Therefore,
A0 =
C
r
;
A1 = 0;
A2 =

vE   C
r

vE;
21Strictly speaking, the second boundary condition should be limV!vE D (V ) = min fvE ; 1g.
That is, the creditors cannot get more than the total face value of debt. However, equity holders
have limited liability and they can issue new equity with no costs as long as the equity value exceeds
zero. It is never optimal for the equity holders to trigger bankruptcy if, after paying the creditors,
there is still any residual left. As far as equity holdersoptimal bankruptcy threshold is concerned,
the boundary condition is reduced to limV!vE D (V ) = vE :
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and the total debt value is
D(V ) =
C
r
+

vE   C
r

V
vE
 
:
Now, consider a claim to the bankruptcy cost (1  ) vE when Vt hits vE. This
security has a current market value, denoted BC(V ), that reects the market value
of a claim to (1  ) vE should bankruptcy occur. Because its returns are time
independent, it too must satisfy equation (8), with boundary conditions
lim
V!1
BC (V ) = 0;
lim
V!vE
BC (V ) = (1  ) vE:
The solution is
BC(V ) = (1  ) vE

V
vE
 
:
Similarly, consider a security that pays a constant interest payment equal to the
tax-sheltering of interest payments (C) as long as the rm is solvent, and pays
nothing in bankruptcy. This claim is also time independent and therefore satises
equation (8), with boundary conditions
lim
V!1
TS (V ) =
C
r
;
lim
V!vE
TS (V ) = 0:
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The solution is
TS (V ) =
C
r
 
1 

V
vE
 !
.
The market value of equity is the residual,
E (V ) = V  D + TS  BC (9)
=

V   (1  ) C
r

+

(1  ) C
r
  vE

V
vE
 
:
Equity holders maximize the market value of equity in equation (9) by choosing
the bankruptcy boundary vE. Here, we can exploit the stated assumption that
smooth-pasting characterizes the optimal threshold:
dE (V )
dV
jV=vE = 1 

vE

(1  ) C
r
  vE

= 0;
which has the solution
vE = (1  ) 
1 + 
C
r
. (10)
Note that
d2E (V )
dV 2
jV=vE=vE =  (1  )
C
r
1
v2E
> 0;
which indicates that E (V ) achieves its global maximum at vE = vE.
A weakly dominant bankruptcy strategy for the equity holders is to default the
rst time the rms asset value falls to vE, regardless of the strategy followed by the
bank. Equivalently,
vE (vB) = vE:
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Loan Value
Now we calculate the market value of bank debt. Denote ~Lt (Vt; vE; vB) 
Lt (Vt; E; B), with  i = inf ft : Vt  vig, i 2 fE;Bg.
There are two ways to achieve our goal. One is to directly calculate the market
value of the bank loan with the aid of Laplace transform. The bank-debt value
becomes
~Lt (Vt; vE; vB)  Et
Z 
t
e r(s t)cds+ e r( t)minf; Vg

=
c
r
 
hc
r
 min (v; )
i
Et
 
e r

=
c
r
+
hc
r
 min (v; )
i
(Vt=v)
  ;
with  = 1
2

  2
2

+
q 
  2
2

+ 2r2

and v = max fvE; vBg, where in the
last step we have used the well-known result of the Laplace transform of the rst
hitting time.
The other way is to use results from the above procedure in calculating equity
value. The bank receives a constant interest payment, c, per instant when the rm
is solvent. Since the bank debt value, ~Lt (Vt; vE; vB), is also time-independent, it
should also satisfy equation (8) with boundary conditions
lim
V!1
~L (V; vE; vB) =
c
r
;
lim
V!vE
~L (V; vE; vB) = min fv; g :
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This leads to the same solution
~L (V; vE; vB) =
c
r
 
c
r
 min fv; g

(V=v)  . (11)
Now we solve the banks optimization problem.
The bank maximizes the market value of bank debt in equation (11) by choosing
the bankruptcy boundary vB, conditional on vE.
Claim 1 Conditional on any given vE, ~L (V; vE; vB) achieves its maximum at
either vB = vE or vB = vB, where vB  =.
Proof If vB < vE, then the bankruptcy threshold is e¤ectively set by the equity
holders and the claim holds. So here we only consider the case where vE  vB. That
is, we consider the cases where the banks bankruptcy threshold actually matters.
For vB > vB, equation (11) simplies to
~L (V; vE; vB) =
c
r
 
c
r
  
 V
vB
 
:
If c=r < , i.e., the face value is higher than the present value of a perpetual
bond without default risks, ~L (V; vE; vB) increases in vB. In this case, the optimal
strategy for the bank is to force bankruptcy as soon as possible because its recovery
claim is too high. This is intuitive because when the recovery claim in bankruptcy is
too high, the bank would demand an immediate repayment by forcing bankruptcy.
However, this is an unrealistic case which we do not discuss further.
If, on the other hand, c=r  , ~L (V; vE; vB) is maximized at vB = vB.
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For vB  vB, equation (11) becomes
~L (V; vE; vB) =
c
r
 
c
r
  vB
 V
vB
 
:
The rst order condition is
~LvB (V; vE; vB) =

(1 + )    
vB
c
r

V
vB
 
:
Setting it to 0 and solving for vB, we get
vB =
1


1 + 
c
r
 vmB .
Moreover, ~LvB (V; vE; vB) > 0 for all vB > v
m
B , and ~LvB (V; vE; vB) < 0 for all vB <
vmB , implying that ~L (V; vE; vB) achieves its minimum at v
m
B .
Therefore, ~L (V; vE; vB) is maximized at either vB or vE. 
Specically, we have the following cases: 1) If vmB > vB, the market value of loan
decreases monotonically in vB. The banks optimal bankruptcy strategy is vB (vE) =
vE. 2) If vmB  vB and vmB  vE, the banks optimal strategy is vB (vE) = vB. 3) If
vE < v
m
B < vB, the maximum of loan value is reached at either vB or vE.
To summarize, we have
vB (vE) =
8>>>><>>>>:
vE, if vB < vmB
vB, if vmB  min fvE; vBg
argmaxv2fvE ;vBg ~Lt (Vt; vE; v) , if vB> v
m
B > vE,
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where vB  = and ~Lt is the market value of the loan dened as ~Lt (Vt; vE; vB) 
Lt (Vt; E; B), with  i = inf ft : Vt  vig, i 2 fE;Bg. QED.
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The e¤ective bankruptcy threshold, v, is the higher of vB and v

E, i.e.
v  max fvB; vEg. Based on results from Proposition 1, we have
 if vmB > vB, or equivalently  < cC 11  vE, vB (vE) = vE and vE (vB) = vE, which
means v = vE;
 if vmB  vB  vE, or equivalently cC 11  vE    vE, vB (vE) = vB and
vE (vB) = vE, which means v
 = vE;
 if vmB  vE  vB, or equivalently cC 11  vE  vE  , vB (vE) = vB and
vE (vB) = vE, which means v
 = vB;
 if vE < vmB < vB, or equivalently  > cC 11  vE >  (T ) vE, vB (vE) 2 fvB; vEg
and vE (vB) = vE.
In summary, the rms bankruptcy threshold is as follows
v =
8>>>><>>>>:
vE, if vB < vmB or vE vB vmB
vB, if vB  vEvmB
argmaxv2fvE ;vBg ~Lt (Vt; vE; v) , if vB > v
m
B > vE.
QED
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Table I
Predicted E¤ects
This table summarizes the predicted e¤ects of rm and bankruptcy characteristics
on the rms bankruptcy boundary, under various hypotheses, where +indicates
a higher likelihood of the rm ling for bankruptcy voluntarily, and  indicates a
higher likelihood of bank creditors forcing bankruptcy.
Predicted E¤ect on jNRBB  1j
Bank-Debt Share  
Bank-Debt HH Index +
Public-Debt HH Index +/ 
Bank-Debt Interest Rate +/ 
Bank-Debt Share of Interests +
Time in Bankruptcy  
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Table II
Summary Statistics on NRBB
This table reports summary statistics on NRBB of the full sample (Panel A), by industry (Panel B), and by year
of bankruptcy ling (Panel C). * indicates that the corresponding group has a mean that is statistically signicantly
di¤erent from other groups, where we determine whether the means of two groups are di¤erent by looking at the
t-statistic of their di¤erence.
Mean Stdev Min 5-Prc Meidan 95-Prc Max N
Panel A. All Firms
Overall 1.85 1.66 0.00 0.24 1.28 6.22 9.81 576
Panel B. By Industry
A: Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 4.75 4.36 1.67 1.67 4.75 7.83 7.83 2
B: Mining 1.53 1.38 0.17 0.24 1.01 5.11 6.24 33
C: Construction 1.77 1.43 0.46 0.46 1.43 5.02 5.02 8
D: Manufacturing 1.85 1.80 0.02 0.22 1.27 6.22 9.81 203
E: Transportation, Communications, 1.72 1.60 0.05 0.20 1.24 5.04 9.51 109
Electric, Gas, Sanitary Services
F: Wholesale Trade 2.23 1.89 0.43 0.51 1.67 6.62 9.37 21
G: Retail Trade 1.97 1.88 0.02 0.13 1.19 6.38 8.58 80
H: Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 2.22 2.49 0.33 0.35 1.25 8.50 8.82 18
I: Services 1.82 1.66 0.00 0.42 1.31 6.27 8.53 102
Panel C. By Year of Bankruptcy Filing
1987 1.82 1.62 0.68 0.68 1.82 2.97 2.97 2
1988 1.53 0.28 1.24 1.24 1.44 1.98 1.98 5
1989 1.74 1.96 0.20 0.20 1.21 6.97 8.03 15
1990 1.56 1.34 0.41 0.42 1.32 5.06 5.67 16
1991 1.99 1.10 0.51 0.60 1.62 3.97 4.00 23
1992 2.23 1.56 0.39 0.65 1.82 5.40 7.86 23
1993 2.24 2.26 0.02 0.17 1.67 7.85 9.37 17
1994 2.50 1.79 0.64 0.65 2.59 6.65 7.54 15
1995 2.02 2.04 0.39 0.45 1.33 7.12 8.21 21
1996 2.09 1.96 0.21 0.22 1.37 6.89 7.83 15
1997 1.47 0.88 0.29 0.31 1.33 3.08 3.09 11
1998 1.49 1.23 0.05 0.08 1.12 3.76 3.96 19
1999 1.65 1.51 0.21 0.32 1.29 3.60 9.30 40
2000 1.51 1.21 0.15 0.22 1.11 5.07 5.50 64
2001* 1.35 1.45 0.00 0.17 1.02 5.00 8.53 84
2002 1.57 1.60 0.02 0.12 1.17 4.53 8.39 88
2003 2.10 2.13 0.26 0.30 1.43 6.56 9.81 50
2004* 2.64 2.37 0.38 0.66 1.68 7.63 8.82 34
2005 2.40 2.17 0.35 0.35 1.64 7.06 8.58 19
2006* 4.19 2.56 0.75 0.76 4.70 7.88 7.94 11
2007* 3.59 2.89 0.54 0.54 3.17 7.48 7.48 4
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Table IV
Representativeness of the Sample
This table reports summary statistics of three di¤erent samples, namely our nal sample, the URD full sample,
and the DRS sample, by Total Book Assets, Default Type, Default Resolution Type, and Industry.
DRS URD Full URD Final
(1970-2006) (1987-2006) (1987-2007) (1987-2007)
Panel A. Total Book Assets ($ millions)
Mean 1529.9 1466.0 1517.3 1624.6
Standard Deviation 6872.8 6535.2 6241.4 6752.7
Minimum 0.2 0.2 11.4 11.4
25-Percentile 151.8 168.9 179.9 181.9
Median 366.9 398.1 387.3 401.1
75-Percentile 1064.1 1106.8 964.6 986.7
Maximum 103803 103803 103803 103803
Panel B. Default Type (%)
Missed interest payment 48.6 50.7 35.0 34.7
Chapter 11 25.7 24.7 19.4 20.5
Distressed exchange 9.7 9.2 4.9 4.3
Grace period default 2.9 3.3 0.5 0.5
Suspension of payments 2.3 2.7 0.9 0.9
Missed principal and 2.2 2.4 0.9 0.7
interest payments
Prepackaged Chapter 11 1.9 2.1 1.9 1.0
Others 6.5 4.8 25.0 24.5
Not in Moodys 0.1 0.0 11.5 12.8
Panel C. Default Resolution Type (%)
Reorganization plan conrmed 27.3 29.3 30.6 31.8
Emerged from Chapter 11 15.7 16.6 13.0 12.2
Distressed exchange 9.7 9.2 4.9 4.3
Liquidated 6.0 6.5 3.4 2.6
Acquired 4.3 4.9 2.8 2.6
Made interest payment 3.6 3.9 0.7 0.7
Emerged from bankruptcy 2.1 2.4 2.4 3.0
Others 0.7 0.8 0.1 0.2
N/A 30.5 26.4 30.6 29.9
Not in Moodys 0.1 0.0 11.5 12.8
Panel D. Industry (%)
A: Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3
B: Mining 3.4 3.1 6.1 5.7
C: Construction 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.4
D: Manufacturing 24.0 24.6 34.4 35.2
E: Transportation, Communications, 13.7 14.3 18.9 18.9
Electric, Gas, Sanitary Services
F: Wholesale Trade 2.5 2.5 4.0 3.6
G: Retail Trade 8.1 8.6 14.6 13.9
H: Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 5.6 5.8 3.1 3.1
I: Services 8.0 8.8 16.9 17.7
J: Public Administration 0.6 0.5 0.0 0.0
N/A 32.5 30.4 0.0 0.0
Number of rms (all panels) 1543 1319 741 576
53
Table V
Determinants of Bankruptcy Boundary
This table reports the results of regression analyses on determinants of bankruptcy boundary. The dependent
variable is jNRBB-1j. Log(Assets) is the logarithm of total book assets in millions of dollars. Leverage is calculated
as book value of total debt divided by total book assets. Bank-Debt Share is the total face value of bank debt divided
by the total face value of all debt. Bank-Debt HHI and Public-Debt HHI are the Herndahl-Hirschman indices of the
nominal amounts of bank debt and public bond instruments of the rm, across di¤erent lenders. Bank-Debt Interest
Rate is the weighted average interest rate paid by the rm to its bank creditors, Bank Share of Interests is the
proportion of interests paid to the bank in the total interests paid to all creditors, Time to Maturity is the weighted
average number of months from a bankruptcy ling to debt maturity across all bank debt, and Time in bankruptcy
is the number of months a rm spent in bankruptcy. Columns 1 and 2 are results for all sample rms. Columns 3
and 4 are results for rms with both bank debt and public bonds. Columns 5 and 6 are results for Chapter 11 cases
only. Odd-number columns are Tobit regressions, and even-number columns are OLS regressions.
Independent Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
Intercept 5.890*** 4.281*** 5.408*** 4.364*** 2.622*** 3.480***
(5.004) (5.078) (4.394) (4.685) (2.815) (4.053)
Log(Assets) -0.060 0.008 -0.025 -0.020 0.094 -0.012
(-0.549) (0.104) (-0.212) (-0.220) (1.086) (-0.155)
Leverage 0.025 0.165 0.122 0.153 0.374* 0.189
(0.111) (0.848) (0.506) (0.723) (1.890) (1.011)
Bank-Debt Share -6.606*** -6.504*** -6.701*** -6.452*** -5.333*** -5.062***
(-9.111) (-8.912) (-8.889) (-8.434) (-6.068) (-5.960)
Bank-Debt HH Index 0.712* 0.508* 0.770** 0.592* 0.345 0.415
(1.994) (1.657) (2.131) (1.816) (1.089) (1.393)
Public-Debt HH Index -0.998*** -0.883*** -0.786*** -0.887*** -0.433* -0.749***
(-3.831) (-3.821) (-2.719) (-3.405) (-1.842) (-3.402)
Bank-Debt Interest Rate -14.530*** -14.576*** -14.848*** -14.933*** -7.893** -7.601**
(-5.056) (-5.112) (-4.972) (-4.949) (-2.437) (-2.450)
Bank Share of Interests 2.649*** 3.289*** 2.657*** 3.346*** 2.227*** 2.240***
(3.743) (4.653) (3.641) (4.537) (2.616) (2.741)
Time to Maturity -0.000 -0.000 -0.006 -0.002 -0.006 -0.005
(-1.364) (-0.641) (-1.291) (-0.494) (-1.191) (-1.103)
Time in Bankruptcy -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.012** -0.012**
(-2.944) (-2.999) (-2.727) (-2.761) (-2.089) (-2.108)
Likelihood -610.5 - -577.3 - -504.0 -
Adjusted R2 - 0.394 - 0.372 - 0.322
Sample Size 576 576 539 539 515 515
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Table VII
Inuence of Other Creditors
This table reports the results of Tobit and OLS regressions analyses of how macroeconomic conditions a¤ect
bankruptcy boundary. The dependent variable is jNRBB-1j, the deviation of the Normalized Realization of the
Bankruptcy Boundary from 1. Log(Assets) is the logarithm of the total book assets of the default rm in millions
of dollars. Leverage is calculated as the book value of total debt divided by the total book assets. Bank-Debt Share
is the total face value of bank debt as a fraction of the total face value of all debt. Bank-Debt HHI and Public-Debt
HHI are the Herndahl-Hirschman indices of the nominal amounts of bank debt and public bond instruments of the
rm, across di¤erent lenders. Bank-Debt Interest Rate is the weighted average interest rate paid by the rm to its
bank creditors, Bank Share of Interests is the proportion of interests paid to the bank in the total interests paid to
all creditors, Time to Maturity is the weighted average number of months from a bankruptcy ling to debt maturity
across all bank debt, and Time in bankruptcy is the number of months a rm spent in bankruptcy.
Bank Debt Same Class Senior Secured
Tobit OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS
Intercept 5.890*** 4.281*** 4.592*** 3.562*** 5.463*** 4.228***
(5.004) (5.078) (4.883) (4.403) (5.094) (5.016)
Log(Assets) -0.060 0.008 -0.068 -0.057 -0.186* -0.161*
(-0.549) (0.104) (-0.737) (-0.700) (-1.818) (-1.932)
Leverage 0.025 0.165 -0.084 -0.033 -0.314 -0.206
(0.111) (0.848) (-0.389) (-0.167) (-1.493) (-1.106)
Bank-Debt Share -6.606*** -6.504*** -0.926*** -1.028*** -1.406*** -1.385***
(-9.111) (-8.912) (-2.838) (-3.278) (-3.974) (-4.100)
Bank-Debt HHI 0.712* 0.508* -0.402 -0.677*** -0.675** -0.763***
(1.994) (1.657) (-1.470) (-2.611) (-2.491) (-3.055)
Public-Debt HHI -0.998*** -0.883*** -0.005 -0.077 0.417 0.293
(-3.831) (-3.821) (-0.017) (-0.290) (1.355) (1.066)
Bank Interest Rate -14.530*** -14.576*** 11.186*** 10.645*** 8.783*** 8.242***
(-5.056) (-5.112) (3.850) (3.858) (2.949) (2.968)
Bank Share of Interests 2.649*** 3.289*** -4.158*** -3.238*** -3.681*** -2.777***
(3.743) (4.653) (-13.319) (-10.778) (-12.009) (-9.397)
Time to Maturity -0.000 -0.000 -0.010*** -0.005* -0.012*** -0.008**
(-1.364) (-0.641) (-2.848) (-1.700) (-3.044) (-2.299)
Time in Bankruptcy -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.011* -0.008 -0.007 -0.005
(-2.944) (-2.999) (-1.787) (-1.328) (-1.169) (-0.928)
Likelihood -610.5 - -637.5 - -584.1 -
Adjusted R2 - 0.394 - 0.312 - 0.322
Sample Size 576 576 567 567 539 539
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Figure 1. Loan and equity values
These graphs show loan and equity values as functions of the rms e¤ective
bankruptcy boundary value of assets. The top graph illustrates that when the bank
creditors boundary vB is larger than vmB , the banks decision depends on whether
vE or vB leads to a higher loan value. When vB is equal to or smaller than vmB , as
depicted in the bottom graph, loan value monotonically decreases in the bankruptcy
boundary, in which case the e¤ective boundary would be the larger of vE and vB.
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Figure 2. Distribution of sample rms by NRBB
This graph illustrates the distribution of rms in our sample by Normalized Re-
alization of Bankruptcy Boundary (NRBB), which is calculated as the ratio of total
rm-wide recovery to the total face value of bank debt.
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Figure 3. Distribution of rms by alternative denitions of NRBB
These graphs illustrate the distribution of sample rms by various alternative
denitions of Normalized Realization of Bankruptcy Boundary (NRBB). Graphs in
Panel A are for all rms in our sample. NRBB is dened as the ratio of total rm-
wide recovery to a denominator, which is the total amount of bank debt and bonds
in the same class (top left), the total amount of bank debt and senior secured bonds
(top right), the total amount of bank debt, senior secured bonds, senior unsecured
bonds (bottom left), or the total amount of bank debt and all senior debt (bottom
right). Graphs in Panel B are for rms nanced only with bank debt (top left) and
rms nanced only with public bonds (the rest three).
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